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This paper presents an explicit model of the entrepreneur’s role in organizing the 
work undertaken by employees. The model assumes that agents vary in their 
ability to carry out this task, and so in one sense the model is a special case of 
Lucas’ [Bell Journal of Economics, 9, pp. 508-523, (1978)] span of control frame-
work. However, the model also relates ability to risk. As in Kihlstrom and Laf-
font [Journal of Political Economy, 87, pp. 719-748 (1979)], the entrepreneur 
bears all risk. But while Kihlstrom and Laffont assume the entrepreneur bears all 
risk and show that as a consequence the least risk averse become entrepreneurs, 
in the present model all agents are risk neutral but entrepreneurs bear all risk as 
an equilibrium outcome. The model is used to study the consequences of firm 
growth driven by entrepreneurial learning or by rising demand.  
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1. Introduction 
Baumol’s (1968) well-known observation that the theoretical firm is “entrepre-
neurless” was accompanied by an enormous degree of pessimism that the state of 
affairs would ever change. Almost forty years later, Bianchi and Henreckson 
(2005: 370) were no more optimistic: “the entrepreneur ‘lacks operational defini-
tion’ and is too elusive to ever fit into the neoclassical model.” This continued 
pessimism is surprising in view of the significant theorizing about the entrepre-
neur over the last few decades. We have learned much from the literature 
spawned by the seminal contributions of Lucas (1978), Kihlstrom and Laffont 
(1979), and Holmes and Schmitz (1990), each of which focuses on a different facet 
of entrepreneurship and management. In one sense, however, these pioneering 
papers are very much in keeping with Baumol’s pessimism. Each is quite vague 
about what exactly it is that entrepreneurs do. Lucas is most explicit: his model 
“does not say anything about the nature of the tasks performed by managers, 
other than that whatever managers do, some do it better than others.” [p. 511].  
This paper analyzes a production technology in which I try to be a little more 
specific about some of what entrepreneurs do. The essence of the production 
technology is as follows. An entrepreneur hires n workers. Each worker carries 
out exactly one unit of work per unit of time, so that n units of work are done in 
the firm. The value of this work, however, depends entirely on the decisions of 
the entrepreneur.1 Each unit of work has a well-defined direction. The entrepre-
neur must decide the direction he would like this work to take, and he is respon-
sible for organizing workers in this direction. Conditional on the intended direc-
tion, the actual direction of individual workers depends on the success with which 
the entrepreneur organizes his employees; the less directed are the employees, the 
less progress they make in the intended direction. 
Individuals are assumed to vary in their ability to organize workers. The model 
predicts that the most able become entrepreneurs, while the least able become 
employees. Among entrepreneurs, the most able manage the largest firms and 
earn the most after paying the wage bill. Because better entrepreneurs manage 
more workers, in equilibrium the productivity of workers is the same in large and 
small firms. The model is obviously a version of Lucas’ (1978) span of control 
                                         
1. For example, a typing pool produces a fixed number of words per day regardless of the 
boss’s identity. How valuable this typing is, however, depends on the abilities of the boss. 
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framework,2 but it also bears some relation to the work of Kihlstrom and Laffont 
(1979) on risk bearing and of Holmes and Schmitz (1990) on business transfers.  
In Kihlstrom and Laffont, entrepreneurs are assumed to earn stochastic profits 
that are the residual earnings after fixed payments to factors. In their framework, 
some individuals are better suited to entrepreneurship because they are less risk 
averse.3 Entrepreneurs also bear all risk in the present model, even though all 
agents are risk neutral. The expected level and variability of firm output depends 
only upon the ability of, and effort expended by, the entrepreneur. Any reward 
scheme that does not require the entrepreneur to bear all risk induces insufficient 
effort, and is therefore inefficient. Thus, in contrast to Kihlstrom and Laffont, in 
which risk-bearing is a maintained assumption but is not efficient relative to ar-
rangements in which employees share some of the risk, this paper produces risk-
bearing as a consequence of the task of organization. 
The model predicts volatile earnings for entrepreneurs but not for wage workers 
and, among entrepreneurs, a positive cross-sectional correlation between mean 
earnings and their volatility. These predictions are also consistent with a frame-
work in which attitudes to risk determine occupational choice. However, after 
showing that the degree of risk aversion required to explain occupational choice 
in PSID data far exceeds conventional estimates, Rosen and Willen (2002) con-
clude that risk attitudes cannot be a major determinant of the decision to become 
self-employed. As previous empirical work imposes no a priori constraints on the 
distribution of abilities, the present model provides an avenue to explain Rosen 
and Willen’s results. 
Section 2 analyzes the model in a static setting. Section 3 introduces dynamics of 
two types. In the first, I assume that entrepreneurs (and possibly employees) can 
                                         
2. In Lucas, individuals vary in their talent for management, and greater talent increases 
the output that can be obtained from managing a given set of inputs. The same mecha-
nism can be found in Rosen (1978, 1982), Calvo and Wellisz (1980), and Irigoyen (2002). 
Murphy, Shliefer and Vishny (1991) explore the implications of the model for economic 
development. 
3. See also Kanbur (1979) and Blanchflower and Oswald (1998). Cressy (2000) and 
Hopenhayn and Vereshchagina (2003) point out that variations in wealth or borrowing 
constraints can induce different degrees of risk aversion among agents with identical pref-
erences. Rigotti, Ryan and Vaithianathan (2005) have extended their framework to toler-
ance of ambiguity. 
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learn over time to organize better. In the second, I assume that demand grows 
over time. In both cases, firms grow as they age, and entrepreneurial earnings 
rise. But other features of firm evolution depend upon the source of growth. 
When growth is driven by learning, measured labor productivity rises if price 
falls in equilibrium, and remains constant if price does not fall. In contrast, firm 
and industry growth driven by rising demand induces a decline in productivity: 
price increases induce entrepreneurs with unchanged ability to increase their pay-
rolls to exploit the rising demand, but they do so at the cost of diluting their 
control over workers. More substantively, demand driven growth (but not growth 
driven by learning) may induce some entrepreneurs to sell their business to 
agents with better organizational ability. The model predicts that businesses that 
are transferred are above average size and earn greater profits, as is the case in 
the two models of business transfers developed by Holmes and Schmitz (1990, 
1995). 
It is perhaps worth closing this section with a brief comment on terminology. I 
have throughout this introduction referred to agents as either workers or entre-
preneurs, while I have also clearly limited attention to a single, management, 
function of the entrepreneur. Indeed, some of what follows is equally applicable to 
managers, although managers do not usually have claims to the entire residual 
profits of the firm after payment of fixed wages.  For good or bad, this inter-
changeability of the terms entrepreneur and manager has a long history that 
dates back to Say (1880), and Franco (2005) has noted that it has persisted in 
much of the industrial organization literature that has followed Lucas (1978). Of 
course, some observers may decide that this focus on a management function of 
entrepreneurs ignores the most distinctive characteristics of entrepreneurship. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, I shall use the term entrepreneur throughout, 
although some readers may prefer the term small business owner.4  
                                         
4. Bianchi and Henrekson (2005:355), for example, argue that “entrepreneurship is not 
only management” and it is conducted in a setting replete with Knightian uncertainty, in 
which risk cannot even be quantified. However, it is not obvious to me that the degree 
and nature of risk provides an especially useful distinction between entrepreneurs and 
managers. In our datasets, entrepreneurship is most frequently measured by self-
employment, and I am unconvinced that the CEO of, say, Ford, faces risk that is more 
quantifiable than that faced by the entrepreneur setting up a landscaping business.  
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2. The Model 
An entrepreneur employs n workers, each of whom does one unit of work per pe-
riod. How productive this work is depends upon how well each worker’s activity 
is aligned with the entrepreneur’s strategy. The degree of alignment is a random 
variable, but the expected distance between the strategy and the directed activity 
depends upon the entrepreneur’s ability in direction and coordination. Figure 1 
illustrates the implementation of this idea for 3n = . The firm’s choice of strategy 
is represented by the slope of the line OS. Each of three workers carries out one 
unit of work, indicated by the lines x1, x2 and x3. The contribution of this work 
toward meeting the firm’s goals depends upon the relation between the direction 
of strategy and the direction of the worker’s effort. For example, the contribution 
of worker 1 is found by connecting a line from a to OS, drawn normal to OS, and 
measuring the distance along OS from the origin to the point y1. Clearly, if 
worker effort and firm goals are perfectly aligned, 1 1y = . I assume that no 
worker contributes a negative amount, so the angle between xi, and OS cannot 
exceed /2π  radians.  
Worker contributions are additive, so we can evaluate the contribution of all 
three workers by the simple geometric expedient of moving the origin of x2 to a, 
and the origin of x3 to b. The total contribution toward the firm’s strategy is 
given by Y, measured along OS. The transformation of Y into output or profit 
depends upon the entrepreneur’s choice of strategy.5 In this paper, I put the 
question of strategy choice to one side, and take the liberty of interpreting Y as 
output. It is therefore convenient to rotate the coordinates to suppress the strat-
egy question, as shown in Figure 2. As each of the line segments xi has unit 
length, the contribution of worker i to output is given by ( )cosi iy θ= . The con-
straint /2 /2i iπ θ π− ≤ ≤ ∀  implies [ ]0,1iy i∈ ∀ .6 
                                         
5. Readers will recognize a close affinity to the geometric analysis of forces applied to an 
object in classical mechanics. One difference, however, is that the effective force in classi-
cal mechanics is indicated by the length of a line connecting the origin to point c. 
6. The assumption that the contribution to output of worker i’s actions does not depend 
on the activity of worker j contrasts sharply with the production technology in recent 
models of coordination. In Dessein and Santos (2006), for example, the contribution to 
output of a worker undertaking task i depends upon the actions of workers undertaking 
all other tasks. 
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FIGURE 1. The coordination problem. 
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Workers operate under imperfect direction and coordination; they do what they 
are told but what they are told to do may not be perfectly aligned with the firm’s 
strategy. Assume, therefore, that each iθ  is a random draw from a distribution F 
with support on the interval [ /2, /2 ]π π− . Note that the iθ  are not choices of 
the workers; they are the consequences of directions from the entrepreneur, but 
deviations from the optimal choice of zero should be thought of as mistakes. It is 
convenient to separate the mean and variance of the iθ , so I assume that F is 
truncated normal with density 
 ( )( )
2 2/2
( )
2 erf / 2 2
e
f
θ σ
θ θ σ π π σ
−
= ,  (1) 
for [ /2, /2]θ π π∈ − , and zero otherwise. Recall that 2σ  is not the variance of θ. 
With symmetric truncation around a zero mean, the variance is 
 ( )( )
2 2/ 8
2 2var( )
2 erf / 2 2
e π σπθ σ π σ
−
= − , (2) 
which is nonetheless increasing in σ. The parameter σ is our measure of the de-
gree of coordination effected by the entrepreneur. Perfect coordination is attained 
whenever 0σ = . At the other extreme, as σ → ∞ , ( )f θ  attains the uniform dis-
tribution on [ /2, /2 ]π π− , so that lim var( )σ θ→∞  2 /12π= . However, it is clear 
from Figure 2 that we are primarily interested in the distribution of the contribu-
tions, yi. A simple transformation of (1) yields the required density: 
 
( )
( ) ( )( )
21 2cos ( ) /2
2
2
( )
1 erf / 2 2
y
y
e
f y
y
σ
σ π π σ
−−
=
−
 (3) 
for [0, 1]y ∈ , and zero otherwise. The expectation, [ ; ]E y σ  is strictly decreasing 
in σ, with [ ; 0] 1E y =  and lim [ ; ] 2/E yσ σ π→∞ = . Even the worst coordinators 
can own firms producing positive output, but they will produce substantially less 
than the best. Similarly, var( ; )y σ  is strictly increasing in σ, with var( ; 0) 0y =  
and 21 42lim var( ; )yσ πσ→∞ = − . 
If σ did not vary with the number of workers to be directed, expected output for 
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a firm with n workers would be [ ; , ] [ ; ]E Y n nE yσ σ= , indicating constant returns 
to scale. Consequently, the best entrepreneur (with the lowest σ) would employ 
all the workers and produce all the output. But of course, a single entrepreneur 
will rapidly become thinly stretched as n rises, and his ability to direct individual 
workers must consequently decline as a firm grows. A simple parameterization 
that I will use here sets ( ) /n n sβσ =  with both β and s strictly positive and fi-
nite; all potential entrepreneurs face the same β, while s is larger for the better 
ones. The extent of coordination is a function of both the ability of the entrepre-
neur and the effort he expends. In this subsection I treat s as an exogenous char-
acteristic of the entrepreneur and so refer to it as an index of ability. In the next 
subsection, I introduce entrepreneurial effort.  
Let p denote the product price, and normalize wages to unity. Assuming further 
that the opportunity cost for the entrepreneur is his foregone wage, the expected 
net earnings of the entrepreneur, [ ]eE w , are 
 ; , ) ; ) 1eE w s p E sπ   = − =        
                  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
2211 cos ( ) /2 /
2
0
2
max ( 1)
1 erf / 2 2
y n s
n
sy e
np dy n
n y s n
β
β βπ π
−−  − +  −  
∫ . (4) 
For the  time being, p will be treated as an exogenous parameter, as though this 
were an industry in a small country open to trade in the good. However, there is 
an upper bound to the price. When 0s → , revenues approach 2 /np π , so [ ]eE w  
is strictly positive for arbitrarily bad entrepreneurs managing arbitrarily large 
firms whenever /2p π> . Thus, it is necessary to assume that /2p π≤ .  
2.1 Ability and Firm Size 
The first result states that the best entrepreneurs operate the largest firms, which 
replicates a central result in Lucas (1978):  
PROPOSITION 1. The optimal firm size satisfies 1/( ) ( , )n s p s βϕ β= .  
PROOF. Differentiate (4) with respect to n and substitute 1//n s βϕ = . Equating 
the resulting expression to zero yields the first order condition for firm size, 
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( ) ( )
( )21 2/2 2/1 cos ( ) /2/ 8
21 1/
1/1/ 2
0
cos ( ) (1 )
2 erf /2 2 1
y
e ye
p y dy
y
ββ ϕπ ϕ
β
ββ
πβ β ϕ βϕπ ϕ
−−−
−
  + + −  −  ∫  
                                                          
2/
1/
erf
2 2 2
β
β
ϕ π π
ϕ
  =     , (5) 
which depends on s and n only through, ϕ. For any given p and β, there is a 
unique solution to (5), ( , )pϕ β , with / 0pϕ∂ ∂ >  and / 0ϕ β∂ ∂ < . This solution 
is not finite if ( )nσ  does not rise sufficiently rapidly with firm size. That is, there 
exists a *( ) 1pβ <  such that *( , ) ( )p pϕ β β β< ∞ ∀ >  and ( , )pϕ β → ∞  
*( )pβ β∀ ≤ .7 In the former [latter] case, it is easy to verify that ( , )pϕ β defines a 
maximum [supremum] of (4).    • 
It will be no surprise that the integral in (4) cannot be evaluated analytically. To 
provide some additional insight into the model, it is therefore useful to supple-
ment the main propositions with some numerical evaluations. Figure 3 illustrates 
the relationship between [ ]eE w and n for several values of s for the case 1β =  
and /2p π= . As Proposition 1 established, the size of firm that maximizes the 
entrepreneur’s expected income is clearly increasing in s. Expected profit is 
higher for larger firms, and this is also a general result: if it were not, high-ability 
entrepreneurs (who operate the larger firms) could match the firm size of low-
ability entrepreneurs and still outperform them. One’s intuition should be that n 
rises more [less] rapidly with ability when β is small [large]. However, it is only 
possible to solve for ( , )pϕ β  numerically; doing so for selected values of β yields 
the plots shown in Figure 4, which are consistent with intuition. 
2.2 Labor Productivity and Firm Size 
How do unit output measures, such as labor productivity, vary with firm size? 
The answer is a straightforward consequence of Proposition 1. As 
1/( ) ( )n s s βϕ β= , it immediately follows that ( , )p βσ ϕ β=  is constant. Hence,  
 
                                         
7. When 1β =  and /2p π= , ( , ) 0.56pϕ β ≈ . In the remainder of the paper, I assume 
that *β β> . 
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FIGURE 4. Entrepreneurial ability and the size of firms (II). 
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FIGURE 3. Entrepreneurial ability and the size of firms (I). 
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using (3), expected productivity is invariant to firm size and, therefore, to entre-
preneurial ability.8 When 1β =  and /2p π=  expected productivity is equal to 
approximately 86 percent of the productivity that would prevail under perfect 
coordination.9  
PROPOSITION 2. For any given price, expected labor productivity is invariant to 
firm size.  
The invariance of expected productivity has important consequences for tradi-
tional empirical research that measures only hired factors of production. First, 
the researcher would infer that the industry operates under a constant returns to 
scale production technology. This inference leads the researcher to conclude that 
firm size is indeterminate, which conclusion is supported directly by the observed 
variation in firm size [cf. Rosen (1982, p. 316)]. The researcher further notes the 
existence of residual profits after paying the wage bill and concludes that workers 
are being paid less than their marginal product, presumably due to some sort of 
market imperfection [cf. Bhaskar, Manning, and To (2002)]. None of these con-
clusions would be correct. 
In a similar vein, the variance of individual contributions to output is invariant 
to firm size. The following proposition is an immediate consequence: 
PROPOSITION 3. The variance of firm output increases with firm size at the rate 
n. The variance of labor productivity declines with increasing employment at 
the rate 1/n . 
The first statement is a trivially-familiar characteristic of firm size distributions: 
split a sample into large and small firms, and the within-group variance of the 
large firms is greater than the within-group variance of the small firms.10 The re-
lationship between firm size and productivity is perhaps less readily apparent. 
Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998) study plant productivity in a substantial sample 
                                         
8. The invariance of productivity to firm size is also a feature of Lucas (1978). 
9. That is when 0 nσ ≡ ∀ , in which case firm size is indeterminate. Expected productivity 
is somewhat higher [lower] when [ ] 1β > < , but numerical evaluations suggest productiv-
ity is not especially sensitive to variations in β. For example, a ten percent change in 
β around β=1 is associated with a two percent change in expected productivity.  
10. Because firm age and size are positively correlated, it is also the case that the vari-
ance of firm size increases with cohort age [e.g. Cabral and Mata (2003)].  
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of large US plants. They construct two measures of plant productivity: one using 
an econometric approach which attributes factor shares to stochastic deviations 
from optimization, the other using a Solow residual approach that attributes to 
factor remuneration variations in output that may arise from randomness in the 
production process. The former concept of productivity is more consistent with 
the present model, and we summarize their results from that approach. They 
find: (i) larger plants are not more productive than smaller plants;11 (ii) produc-
tivity is not correlated with age; and (iii) larger plants are less likely to move up 
or down in relative productivity rankings.12 The model’s predictions about pro-
ductivity are consistent with this evidence. 
2.3 Factor Shares 
In this subsection, I replicate another result from Lucas (1978). Using the optimal 
employment level, 1/( , )n p s βφ β= , to eliminate s from (4) yields an expression 
showing that residual profits after wages are proportional to n. The key result 
follows immediately: 
PROPOSITION 4. The entrepreneurial rent share, ( )[ ]/ [ ] ) ,E E nπ π +  is independ-
ent of firm size.  
Of course, as n is an increasing function of ability, the model allows for possibly 
significant variation in entrepreneurs’ incomes. 
2.4 Entrepreneurial Risk Bearing 
Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) have argued that a key function of the entrepre-
neur is to bear risk. They analyze a model in which inputs are paid fixed wages 
and the entrepreneur receives the residual profit, which is stochastic. But why is 
this particular arrangement appropriate? In the present model, it can be justified 
                                         
11. This is their only finding in the list that is not robust to methodology. With produc-
tivity measured by Solow residuals, productivity rises with size. Bartelsman and Dhrymes 
(1998) note that they have no explanations for the difference in results. Outlon (1998) 
tentatively concludes that large British firms may be less productive than small firms, 
while Lentz and Mortenson (2005) observe no relationship between employment and la-
bor productivity among Danish firms. 
12. Palangkaraya, Stierwald and Yong (2005) replicated this result for large Australian 
firms. 
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on efficiency grounds. Workers accomplish the same amount of work regardless of 
where they work; the risk associated with their contribution to output depends 
only on the coordination activity of the entrepreneur. Of course, in the absence of 
choice variables any means of distributing the firm’s product would be equally 
efficient. In this section, I introduce entrepreneurial effort, e, and assume that 
σ is a function of effort, rather than ability. The intuition is then straightforward: 
any payment scheme that assigns to workers a positive fraction of residual profits 
after payment of fixed wages reduces the entrepreneur’s effort below the optimal 
level. This reduces revenues, and the firm is less valuable than to an entrepreneur 
who offers a purely fixed wage. Efficiency requires that the entrepreneur receives 
the full marginal product of effort, and an incidental consequence of this is that 
he also bears all the risk. 
More formally, let ( )nR e  denote expected revenues for a firm with n workers, 
conditional on entrepreneurial effort. Assume Rn is an increasing concave function 
of effort,13 and let the cost of effort be unity. Suppose the entrepreneur pays him-
self a fixed wage, v, and he offers workers a fixed wage, w, plus a fraction of re-
sidual profits, ( )( ) /nR e v wn nα − − , to each worker. The remainder of the resid-
ual profits go to the entrepreneur. If all agents are risk neutral, it must be the 
case that ( )( )( ) /(1 )nwn n R e vα α= − − − , so that the income expected from 
working for this firm equals the fixed wage offered by other firms. If the entre-
preneur can commit to the level of effort when contracting with workers, the 
value of α does not matter. In this case, his expected net earnings are  
 
( )( )
( ) (1 ) ( )
1
n
e n
n R e v
w e R e v v e
αα α
 − −  = − − − + −   −   
        ( )( )nR e e n= − − , (6) 
which does not depend upon α. With commitment, any degree of profit sharing is 
equally efficient. This is not the case when the entrepreneur cannot commit to a 
particular level of effort. Let ( )w α  denote the wage set upon hiring workers. The 
entrepreneur’s effort is the solution to  
                                         
13. A simple parameterization for effort substitutes e s=  in (4). This yields an increas-
ing quasi-concave function, which suffices for what follows. 
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 ( ){ }* *( ) argmax (1 ) ( ) ( )n
e
e R e v nw v eα α α= − − − + − , (7) 
yielding the first order condition ( )* 1(1 )nR e α −′ = − , so that *( )e α  and 
* *( ) ( )nR e eα α  −    are strictly decreasing in α. Given the fixed wage bill, 
*( )w e nα  =   ( )*( ) /(1 )nn R e vα α α α − − −    the entrepreneur’s net income is [from 
(6)] *( )ew e α  =   ( )* *( ) ( )nR e e nα α  − −   , which is strictly decreasing in α.14 Any 
reward scheme that does not fully reward the entrepreneur for his effort is there-
fore inefficient. Moreover, in contrast to Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), entrepre-
neurs bear all risk even though everyone is risk neutral. 
The analysis is more complicated if agents are risk averse, because there are three 
interacting effects of profit sharing. For a given level of effort, the entrepreneur’s 
expected utility rises if he can substitute a fixed payment for part of his claim on 
residual profits. In order to do so, however, he must raise the expected earnings 
of workers to compensate them for accepting risk. Finally, of course, any change 
in the wage structure designed to diversify risk has direct consequences for the 
optimal amount of effort. Ignoring this last consequence (i.e. when effort is ex-
ogenous), there is likely to be profit sharing, except when entrepreneurs are suffi-
ciently wealthy relative to employees. Because larger firms ceteris paribus yield 
larger residual profits for the entrepreneurs, this implies that the degree of profit 
sharing [the fraction of risk borne by the entrepreneur] declines [rises] with firm 
size. When effort is endogenous, the outcome depends on the productivity of en-
trepreneurial effort relative to the degree of risk aversion. If output is sufficiently 
sensitive to effort, then the entrepreneur will continue to bear all risk. In inter-
mediate cases, a conditional  form of Kihlstrom and Laffont’s main result sur-
vives: if there is variation in risk aversion between agents with equal ability, then 
the least risk averse are the most appropriate entrepreneurs. 
2.5 Risk and Return 
Expected output per worker is independent of firm size, n, as is the entrepreneu-
rial rent share. It then follows that entrepreneurial income is proportional to firm 
size. As the variance of output is proportional to firm size, the model generates a 
                                         
14. Of course, n will also vary with α. But this serves simply to strengthen the finding. 
An entrepreneur with firm size n and profit sharing level α>0 will prefer to reduce α to 
zero and increase his income. He may then decide to alter n and further increase income. 
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positive correlation between the mean and variance of entrepreneurs’ earnings. 
This positive correlation is consistent with the conventional wisdom that risk 
aversion demands a risk premium, but in the present model it arises as an equi-
librium response to variations in ability across risk-neutral entrepreneurs.   
Using data from the PSID, Rosen and Willen (2002) confirm that the self-
employed have higher and more volatile income than wage earners, but then pro-
ceed to question whether risk aversion can explain the apparent risk premium for 
self-employment. They find that the degree of relative risk aversion required to 
explain occupational choice exceeds conventional estimates by an order of magni-
tude,15 and hence that risk attitudes cannot be a major determinant of the deci-
sion to become self-employed.16 As previous empirical work imposes no a priori 
constraints on the distribution of abilities, the present model’s link between abil-
ity and income variance may be a plausible explanation of Rosen and Willen’s 
results. 
2.6 General Equilibrium  
The analysis so far has been of the “partial partial equilibrium” type: I have 
treated both the wage of workers and the price of output as exogenous data, and 
analyzed optimality in a single firm. In this subsection, I derive the equilibrium 
of an economy characterized by the production technology in (3). For compact-
ness, I revert to the setting in which effort does not matter. All individuals may 
either produce one unit of work as a wage earner, or they may run a single firm 
with success that depends on ability, s.  
Two equations determine equilibrium. The first is the zero profit condition for 
the marginal entrepreneur. Entrepreneurial earnings increase with s, so for any 
given price there is a critical skill level, s , satisfying [ ]; , 0eE w p s = , such that 
                                         
15. Among the less [more] educated, the coefficient of relative risk aversion required to 
explain employment is 129 [55], compared with conventional estimates of between 1 and 
3. An alternative interpretation is that a model of occupational choice driven only by risk 
aversion explains only about one percent of the observed difference in consumption levels 
between the self-employed and wage earners.  
16. A rather different puzzle is raised by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), who 
study the return to financial investment in public and private equity portfolios. They find 
that the returns are about the same but, because private equity portfolios tend to be 
much less diverse, their risk is much greater.  
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individuals with s s≥  become entrepreneurs and the remainder become employ-
ees. As [ ]; ,eE w p s  rises with p, it is clear that s  falls with p. Output per worker 
in the marginal firm tends to one as s → ∞  so, with a wage of unity, it follows 
that lim ( ) 1s p s→∞ = . At the other extreme, as  0s → , output per worker tends 
to 2/π  and for given n [ ]0lim ; ,s eE w p s→ = (2 / 1) 1n p π − − . Thus, 0lim ( )s p s→ =  
( 1)/2n nπ + . As n becomes unbounded for any /2p π≥ , 0lim ( )s p s→ =  
lim ( 1)/2 /2.n n nπ π→∞ + =  The pairs of values { , }p s  satisfying the zero-profit 
condition, [ ]; , 0eE w p s = , define a negatively-sloped line bounded between 1p =  
and /2p π= . This is shown in Figure 5 as the line ZP.  
The second equation is a full employment constraint. Let the population be N 
and let F(s) denote the distribution of ability in the economy. Then a fraction 
1 ( )F s−  of the population becomes entrepreneurs. As each entrepreneur with 
ability s employs 1/( , )p s βϕ β  workers, the full employment constraint is 
 1/
1
1 ( ) ( , ) ( ) 1
s
F s p s dF s
N
βϕ β
∞
− + =∫ . (8) 
Differentiating yields 
FIGURE 5. General Equilibrium. 
1
π/2
p*
ZP
FE
0
P
s*s
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( )1/
1/
( ) ( , )
0
( )p
s
f s N p sp
s s dF s
β
β
ϕ β
ϕ ∞
+∂ = >∂ ∫ , (9) 
where /p pϕ ϕ= ∂ ∂ . From (8), it is clear that p must increase without bound as 
s → ∞ , else the integral term vanishes. At the other extreme, as 0s → , we re-
quire that ( , ) 0pϕ β →  for all s, which in turn requires that price falls to unity. 
The full employment constraint, indicated by the line FE in Figure 5, conse-
quently traces a positively-sloped relationship between p and s , beginning below 
ZP and then rising above it. As a result, there is a unique equilibrium.     
There are few free parameters to concern ourselves about much in the way of 
comparative statics. One exception concerns changes in the distribution of skills. 
An increase in the ability of all agents induces every incumbent entrepreneur to 
increase employment. This violates the full employment constraint, and the 
change in ability must be offset at any given price by a reduction in the number 
of entrepreneurs. Thus, FE shifts right. The net result is a reduction in the equi-
librium price, and an increase in s . An improvement in the technology for orga-
nizing workers, captured parametrically by, for example, a reduction in β, shifts 
both lines. For any given value of s, profits rise as β falls, so the zero profit con-
dition implies price must fall at each s . Similarly, for each s, optimal employ-
ment rises, so price must also fall at each s  in the full employment constraint. 
Thus, both FE and ZP shift down, inducing a reduction in price, but an ambigu-
ous effect on the identity of the marginal entrepreneur.  
3. Entrepreneurial Learning and Demand Growth 
This section considers in partial equilibrium the implications of the model for 
firm growth and industry dynamics. Two engines of growth are considered. In the 
first, growth is driven by entrepreneurial learning. In the second, firms grow in 
response to secular increases in demand. Subsection 3.1 briefly considers growth 
of a single firm in an otherwise static industry, while subsections 3.2 and 3.3 con-
sider some consequences of the two engines of growth. Throughout this section, I 
set 1β =  in order to reduce notation. 
3.1 Firm Growth 
The expected output of a firm run by an entrepreneur with skill s is  
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 [ ]
( )
( ) ( )( )
21 21 cos ( ) /2 ( )
2
0
2
( )
1 erf / 2 2 ( )
y p
sy e
E y s dy
y p
ϕ
π π ϕ
−−
=
−∫  
           ( )p sφ= , (10) 
where ( ) 0pφ′ > . Output is clearly increasing in both s and p. Expected labor 
productivity is 
 
[ ] ( )
( ) ( )( )
21 21 cos ( ) /2 ( )
2
0
( ) ( ) 2
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 erf / 2 2 ( )
y pE y s p y e
dy
n s p p y p
ϕφ
ϕ ϕ π π ϕ
−−
= =
−∫ , (11) 
which is decreasing in p and (consistent with Proposition 2) independent of s. It 
immediately follows that the two engines of growth have different consequences 
for firm characteristics. If the entrepreneur improves his organizing skills over 
time, the resulting increases in s raise output for given n and, further, induce the 
firm to increase employment. However, the increase in employment exactly off-
sets the effect of higher ability on individual workers. As a result, growth driven 
by entrepreneurial learning is characterized by rising output and employment, 
but constant labor productivity. When growth is driven by improvements in 
market conditions, reflected here by an increase in the price, output and em-
ployment rise, but in this case firm growth is accompanied by declining labor 
productivity. 
3.2 Growth from Learning 
Assume there is a continuum of potential entrepreneurs with measure one, and 
that there exists an outside option paying a unit wage. Denote demand by 
( ) ( ),D p Ag p=  ( ) 0,g p′ ≤  so that A is a convenient scaling factor. To derive in-
dustry supply, recall that the marginal entrepreneur’s skill level satisfies the zero 
profit condition, ( )p p sφ − ( ( ) 1) 0.p sϕ + =  Using (10), the industry supply curve 
is given by 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
s p
Y p p sdF sφ
∞
= ∫ , (12) 
where ( ) 1( ) ( ) ( )s p p p pφ ϕ −= −  is decreasing in p. Market equilibrium requires that 
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( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
s p
Ag p p sdF sφ
∞
− =∫ . (13) 
To consider the effect of learning, replace s with ( )s h sα+  for some 0α ≥ , and 
some non-negative function h(s). This characterization of course implies that all 
agents with ability s learn at exactly the same rate. If ( ) 0h s =  for all ,s s≤  only 
incumbent entrepreneurs learn, while if ( ) 0h s >  for any ,s s≤  some employees 
also learn about coordinating inputs. Market equilibrium then requires that 
  [ ]
( ) ( ( ))
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
s p h s p
Ag p p s h s dF s
α
φ α
∞
−
− + =∫ . (14) 
Differentiating (14) with respect to α and evaluating at 0α =  yields 
 ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
s p
s p
p h s dF s
p
p sdF s p sf s s p Ag p
φ
α
φ φ
∞
∞′ = − <′ ′ ′− −
∫
∫ . (15) 
The effects of learning are straightforward. The rightward shift in the supply 
curve is given in the numerator, and the induced decline in price (and increase in 
industry output) depends on the slopes of the supply and demand functions. Re-
calling that ( )p sφ  is the expected output of a firm indexed by skill level s, the 
term ( ) ( )p h s dφ α  is the increase in expected output for a type s firm that is real-
ized when price is held constant. The numerator sums this increase in output 
over all entrepreneurs. The slope of the supply curve is given by the first two 
terms in the denominator. The first of these sums over all incumbents the change 
in expected firm output induced by the decline in market price. The second is the 
change in output induced by a change in the marginal entrepreneur.  
Equation (15) cannot tell us whether learning induces exit of incumbent entre-
preneurs, or the creation of employee startups. To see this, note that the skill 
level of the marginal entrepreneur satisfies 
  ( ) ( ) 1( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))s p h s p p p pα α α α φ α ϕ α −+ = − , (16) 
from which we obtain 
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 ( )20
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
ds p p p p
h s p
d p p pα
φ φ ϕ αα φ ϕ=
 ′ ′+ −   ′= − −   − 
. (17) 
Learning by the marginal agent has a direct, negative, effect, ( ),h s−  on the value 
of s , which induces employee startups. Opposing this is a positive price effect on 
s , which encourages exit by incumbents and discourages employee startups. Ei-
ther effect may dominate. For example, under perfectly elastic demand, learning 
can only induce entry. On the other hand, if learning is limited to incumbent en-
trepreneurs, then it can only induce exit.  
We already know that, holding price constant, an increase in entrepreneurial abil-
ity has no impact on labor productivity, while a decline in price with ability held 
constant raises productivity. As a result, supply-side growth will be associated in 
equilibrium with rising productivity among incumbents. However, average pro-
ductivity in the industry may not rise if learning is limited to employees who 
then create startups, because mass is then being added to the lower end of the 
skill distribution of entrepreneurs. 
3.3 Growth from Expanding Demand 
The effects of growth driven by increased demand is captured by a rightward 
shift of the demand curve. For example, the price effect of an increase in A is 
 
( )
( )
( ) 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
s p
g p
p A
p sdF s p sf s s p Ag pφ φ∞
′ = >′ ′ ′+ −∫ , (14) 
The interpretation is entirely standard: growth through expanding demand raises 
price and quantity; it induces increased output by incumbents at the cost of de-
clining labor productivity; and it induces new entrants. 
Entrepreneurs may seek to avoid the declining productivity induced by demand 
growth by selling the firm to a new owner with greater ability, who is more able 
to exploit the profit opportunities offered by expanding demand. A complete 
analysis of business transfers is beyond the scope of this paper; it requires, for 
example, that we specify how entrepreneurs are born and retire, as in the two 
models of Holmes and Schmitz (1990, 1995). But without undertaking a complete 
dynamic analysis, it is possible to draw a comparison with some of results from 
Holmes and Schmitz’ analyses of business transfers. In their first model, agents 
   
 20
differ in their ability to develop new businesses, but all agents are equally gifted 
at managing existing businesses. The most capable agents therefore are quick to 
sell businesses so they can get back to the task of new business development. The 
model predicts that firms that are transferred are on average better quality than 
firms that are not, and the agents who sell business are more able than those who 
do not. In their second model, there is no distinction between business develop-
ment and management, and all agents are ex ante identical. The profitability of a 
business depends both on its quality and the quality of the match between the 
business and the entrepreneur. The model predicts that poor matches are likely 
to result in quick transfers of ownership. However, better business are also more 
likely to be sold, because the value of a good match is greater the better the qual-
ity of the business.  
The present model is also consistent with the prediction that better quality firms 
(i.e. those with the greatest increases demand) are more likely to be transferred. 
What about the quality of the entrepreneur? The present model predicts that 
lower quality entrepreneurs are more likely to sell business, because entrepreneurs 
transfer businesses that have become too large given their ability to organize la-
bor. Although the present model depends upon permanently differing abilities, 
this result is more in line with Holmes and Schmitz’ (1995) second model.17 Intui-
tively, an expansion of firm size in the face of fixed entrepreneurial ability is 
analogous to a decline in match quality. 
To establish these results, consider the following simple thought experiment. 
There exist a set of incumbent entrepreneurs with skill levels drawn from the dis-
tribution ( )F s , each of whom produces a unique product that initially sells at a 
common price, 0.p   Subsequently, each entrepreneur experiences an improvement 
in the quality of his product as perceived by consumers, which translates into a 
rise in the price for his product. Let ( )G p  denote the distribution of random price 
draws, with 0( ) 0G p =  and ( ) 1G p =  for some /2p π≤ . There is also a set of 
potential buyers of these firms, which consists of agents with abilities, s ′ , also 
drawn from the distribution ( )F s ′ . Each incumbent is matched at random with 
                                        
17. And it is more in line with evidence indicating that transferred businesses were un-
derperforming. For example, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) find that transferred busi-
nesses had lower initial levels of productivity but higher subsequent growth. McGuckin 
and Ngyen (1995) also report that the productivity of acquired plants rises following a 
takeover. See Holmes and Schmitz (1990, 1995) for discussion of further evidence. 
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one member of the set of potential buyers. Let ( )H s s′ − , denote the distribution 
of the difference between the abilities of the (potential) buyers and sellers, noting 
that 12(0)H = . The incumbent may sell to his match with a transfer cost k, and 
he will do so if there is a net surplus to be had from the transfer. Recalling that 
expected profits for an entrepreneur are [ | , ]eE w s p = ( )( ) ( ) 1,p p p sφ ϕ− +  the 
gain from transferring a business from an agent with ability s to one with ability 
s ′  is ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ,p p p s s kφ ϕ ′− − −  where ( )( ) ( )p p pφ ϕ−  is positive and increasing in 
p. Hence, a transfer therefore takes place only if ( )/ ( ) ( ) .s s k p p pφ ϕ′ − ≥ −  That 
is, the potential buyer must have strictly greater ability than the incumbent, but 
the difference is decreasing in the quality of the firm’s product. As a result, p 
tends to be higher than average for transferred businesses, while s tends to be 
lower than average.18  
More formally, let ( )P s s′ −  be the lowest price that satisfies 
( )/ ( ) ( ) ,s s k p p pφ ϕ′ − ≥ −  so that 0* max[ , ( )]p p P s s′= −  is the minimum price 
at which a transfer takes place. It then follows that 
 ( )| ( ) ( ) /( )E p p p p k s sφ ϕ ′− ≥ −   
                            
0 *
1
2 ( ) ( )
1 ( *)
p
p
pdG p dH s s
F p
∞
′= −−∫ ∫  
                            
00
2 ( ) ( )
p
p
pdG p dH s s
∞
′≥ −∫ ∫  
                            
00
2 ( ) ( )
p
p
dH s s pdG p
∞
′= −∫ ∫  
                            
0
( )
p
p
pdG p= ∫ , (15) 
so businesses that are transferred are on average better quality. Conversely, we 
have  
 
                                        
18. Note also that higher growth rates for p induce more businesses to be transferred. 
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 ( )| / ( ) ( )E s s s k p p pφ ϕ ′≤ − −    
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1
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s
sdF s dF s
F s
′∞
′≤ ′∫ ∫  
                          |E s s s ′= ≤   
                          [ ]E s< , (16) 
so the ability of entrepreneurs who transfer their business is on average lower.  
4. Conclusions 
This paper has explored one possible answer to the question: what is it that en-
trepreneurs (and managers) do? Perhaps more precisely, it has explored what 
there is to learn from developing a tractable model of one particular activity—
coordinating the efforts of workers. Coordination is of course not the only task for 
the entrepreneur. Hellman (2007), for example, has recently analyzed the essen-
tial task of collecting resources. Nonetheless, coordination does seem to be an im-
portant activity and, as in previous work, there is likely something to learn from 
focusing on a single activity to the exclusion of others. 
There are undoubtedly also a variety of ways in which one might model this co-
ordination activity. The approach taken in this paper is especially tractable, but 
it also provides some substance, or ‘microstructure’ to the activities only implic-
itly  present in Lucas’ (1978) classic paper. Moreover, it does so in a way that 
relates the ability of the entrepreneur to coordinate workers to the implications 
drawn from very different models of entrepreneurial behavior. In particular, the 
model provides an endogenous explanation for why entrepreneurs are risk bearers 
in equilibrium, an activity that was simply assumed to be a task of entrepreneurs  
in Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979). It also replicates some key implications about 
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business transfers that Holmes and Schmitz (1990) derived in framework that 
focused on the inventive activity of entrepreneurs.  
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